Provenance in Agent-mediated Healthcare Systems by Kifor, T et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1109/MIS.2006.119
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Kifor, T., Varga, L. Z., Vazquez-Salseda, S., Alvarez, S., Willmott, S., Miles, S., & Moreau, L. (2006).
Provenance in Agent-mediated Healthcare Systems. Intelligent Systems, IEEE , 21(6), 38-46.
10.1109/MIS.2006.119
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
  
Provenance in Agent-mediated Healthcare Systems 
Tamás Kifor1, László Z. Varga1,  
Javier Vázquez-Salceda2, Sergio Álvarez2, Steven Willmott2,  
Simon Miles3, Luc Moreau3 
1 Computer and Automation Research Institute,  
Kende u. 13-17, 1111 Budapest, Hungary 
{tamas.kifor, laszlo.varga}@sztaki.hu;  
http://www.sztaki.hu/ 
2 Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya,  
Jordi Girona Salgado 1-3, E - 08034 Barcelona, Spain 
{jvazquez, salvarez, steve}@lsi.upc.edu;  
http://www.upc.edu/ 
3 School of Electronics & Computer Science, University of Southampton,  
Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK 
{sm, L.Moreau}@ecs.soton.ac.uk;  
http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/ 
Abstract. Agent-oriented cooperation techniques and standardized electronic 
healthcare record exchange protocols can be used to combine information 
regarding different facets of a therapy received by a patient from different 
healthcare providers at different locations. Provenance is an innovative approach 
to trace events in complex distributed processes, dependencies between such 
events, and associated decisions by human actors. We focus on three aspects of 
provenance in agent-mediated healthcare systems: first, we define the provenance 
concept and show how it can be applied to agent-mediated healthcare 
applications; second, we investigate and provide a method for independent and 
autonomous healthcare agents to document the processes they are involved in 
without directly interacting with each other; and third, we show that this method 
solves the privacy issues of provenance in agent-mediated healthcare systems. 
 
1 Introduction 
Cooperation among people using electronic information and techniques is an increasingly 
common practice in every field, including healthcare applications. In the case of distributed 
medical applications, the data (containing the healthcare history of a single patient), the 
workflow (of the procedures carried out on that patient) and the logs (recording meaningful 
events in those procedures) are distributed among several heterogeneous and autonomous 
information systems. These information systems are under the authority of different 
healthcare actors such as general practitioners, hospitals, hospital departments, etc. which 
form disconnected islands of information. Communication and coordination between 
organizations and among members of a medical team, allowing the sharing of information and 
distributed decision making is often supported by agent-based techniques [1], because 
modeling application components as agents with some degree of autonomy easily reflects the 
decentralized nature of the network of healthcare institutions and can be considered as the 
natural extension to the notion of encapsulation in systems that are owned and developed by 
different authorities.  
Even when using agent technologies, the distributed nature of healthcare institutions 
sometimes hinders the treatment of patients, because documentation of the healthcare history 
and therapy of a patient is split into independent healthcare institutions. In order to provide 
  
better, user-centered healthcare services, the treatment of a patient requires viewing the 
processes and data as a whole. Although agent-based cooperation techniques and standardized 
electronic healthcare record exchange techniques support the semantic interoperation between 
healthcare providers, we still face the problem of the reunification of the different pieces of 
the therapy of a single patient executed at different places. Currently there are some countries 
that have no unification method for patient healthcare records; each region in the country or 
even each institution inside a region may have its own medical record system, sometimes not 
even fully electronic, and with no automatic health care record exchange mechanisms. 
Therefore, it is not uncommon for doctors to depend on the patients themselves in order to 
include data from previous treatments and tests. 
Making electronic systems provenance aware [2] enables users to trace how a particular result 
has been arrived at by identifying the individual and aggregated services that produced a 
particular output. In healthcare multi-agent systems (HC-MAS) there is a need to provide an 
integrated view of the execution of treatment processes, to analyze the performance of 
distributed healthcare services, and to be able to carry out audits of the system to assess that, 
for a given patient, the proper decisions were made and the proper procedures were followed. 
All of these tasks depend on being able to trace back the origins of decisions and processes, 
the information that was available at each step, and where that information came from. Note 
that the provenance of a piece of data is primarily about the causal dependencies of execution 
steps, although time sequences can also be handled. The provenance architecture of [2] 
focuses on making service-oriented systems provenance aware, but making healthcare agent 
systems provenance aware needs additional techniques described in this paper, because agents 
are autonomous actors and, unlike in service oriented systems, they may participate in the 
same process without directly interacting with each other. 
Thus the main contribution of this paper is showing how healthcare agents interacting in an 
ad-hoc way can be augmented with the capability to produce at execution-time an explicit 
representation of the process actually taking place, without compromising the privacy 
protection in the original system. 
First, we define the concept of provenance in Section 2. In Section 3 we describe an organ 
transplant management application and show how provenance can be applied to that 
application when agents directly interact. Then, in Section 4 we describe a method for 
independent and autonomous healthcare agents to document the processes when there is no 
direct interaction between them, and, in Section 5 we describe how this method helps to 
handle privacy issues of provenance in HC-MAS. Section 6 presents related work and we 
conclude in Section 7. 
2 The Provenance concept 
Trust in results produced by HC-MAS can be increased if we know the provenance of the 
particular result. As described in [2], the concept of provenance is already well known in fine 
art where it refers to the trusted, documented history of some work of art. This concept of 
provenance may also be applied to data and information generated within a computer system.  
The provenance of a piece of data is represented in a computer system by some suitable 
documentation of the process that produced the data, called process documentation. This 
documentation can be complete or partial; it can be accurate or inaccurate; it can present 
conflicting or consensual views of the actors involved; it can be detailed or not. Provenance is 
investigated in open, large-scale systems typically designed using a service-oriented approach 
[3].  
  
The technology-independent approach of the PROVENANCE project1 to service-oriented 
architectures (SOAs) has formal foundations in the -calculus2 [4] and asynchronous 
distributed systems [5]. According to this view, messages are the only mechanism used to 
transfer information between actors. This view also allows formal definition of mappings 
between a) GRID applications, b)Web Services and c) Agent-Mediated Services and 
Applications. Therefore, services are regarded as components that take inputs and produce 
outputs. Such services are brought together by composition into a process to solve a given 
problem. In this abstract view, interactions with services (seen as actors in the process and 
realized as agents in a HC-MAS) take place using messages that are constructed in 
accordance with service interface specifications (agent messages in the case of HC-MAS). 
Documentation of processes is represented in a computer system by a set of p-assertions, 
which are assertions made by the actors involved in those processes, documenting some step 
of the process. There are two kinds of p-assertions that capture an explicit description of the 
flow of data in a process: interaction p-assertions and relationship p-assertions. An 
interaction p-assertion is an assertion of the contents of a message by an actor that has sent or 
received that message. A relationship p-assertion is an assertion about an interaction, made by 
an actor that describes how the actor obtained output data or the whole message sent in that 
interaction by applying some function to input data or messages from other interactions. An 
interaction p-assertion, therefore links together the actions of two actors in a process, while a 
relationship p-assertion links together multiple actions by a single actor. In addition, actor 
state p-assertions are assertions made by an actor about their internal state in the context of a 
specific interaction. 
The provenance store is the long-term facility for storing process documentation. A 
provenance store is used to manage and provide controlled access to process documentation. 
The provenance lifecycle is composed of four different phases. First, actors create p-assertions 
that are aimed at representing their involvement in a computation. After their creation, p-
assertions are stored in a provenance store, with the intent they can be used to reconstitute the 
provenance of some data. After a data item has been computed, users or applications can 
query the provenance store. At the most basic level, the result of the query is the set of p-
assertions pertaining to the process that produced the data. More advanced query facilities 
may return a representation derived from p-assertions that are of interest to the user. Finally 
the provenance store and its contents can be managed (subscription management, content 
relocation, etc). The provenance architecture is supported by a set of tools and a reference 
implementation of both the provenance store and the client-side libraries that provide 
connectivity between the actors and the stores. 
By transforming a MAS into a provenance-aware MAS, the resulting system gets the 
capability to produce at execution-time an explicit representation of the distributed processes 
that are taking place (see example in Section 3). Such representation can be then queried and 
analyzed in order to extract valuable information to validate, e.g., the basis of decisions taken 
in a given case, or to make an audit of the system over a period of time. 
In the case of a HC-MAS, by recording all the medical processes related to a given patient 
one can re-construct the treatment medical history of the patient. Therefore, making a HC-
MAS provenance-aware provides a way to have a unified view of a patient’s medical record 
with its provenance, i.e. to connect each part of the medical record with the processes in the 
                                                 
1 http://www.gridprovenance.org/ 
2 The π-calculus is of interest in this context because of its approach to defining events that are internal to actors as hidden 
communications. 
  
real world that originated it and/or the individuals, teams or units responsible for each piece of 
data. 
3 An example: the Organ Transplant Management 
Application 
We will show how provenance can be used in HC-MAS through the application domain of 
Organ Transplant Management (OTM). The agent-mediated application we will use as 
example is the Organ Transplant Management Application (OTMA) that is a demonstrator in 
the PROVENANCE project.  
3.1 Brief description of the OTMA system 
The OTMA system aims to speed up the allocation process of solid organs to improve graft 
survival rates. It is an evolution from the CARREL Agent-Mediated Electronic Institution [6], 
developed not only with the help of the medical staff but also taking into account the 
recommendations of the hospitals’ system administrators. Treatment of patients through the 
transplantation of organs or tissue is one of the most complex medical processes currently 
carried out, as it is a distributed problem involving several locations (donating hospital, 
potential recipient hospitals, test laboratories and organ transplant authorities), a wide range 
of associated processes, rules and decision making. Figure 1 summarizes the different 
administrative domains (solid boxes) and units (dashed boxes) that are modeled in the OTMA 
system. Each of these interact with each other through agents (circles) that exchange 
information and requests through messages. In a transplant management scenario, one or 
more hospital units may be involved: the hospital transplant unit, one or several units that 
provide laboratory tests and the Electronic Healthcare Record (EHCR) subsystem which 
manages the health care records for each institution. The diagram also shows some of the data 
stores that are involved: apart from the patient records, these include stores for the transplant 
units and the Organ Transplant Authority (OTA) recipient waiting lists (WL). Hospitals that 
are the origin of a donation also keep records of the donations performed, while hospitals that 
are recipients of the donation may include such information in the recipient's patient record. 
The OTA has its own records of each donation, stored case by case. 
The Electronic Healthcare Record (EHCR) subsystem of OTMA provides a way to manage 
patient records distributed in different institutions. The subsystem provides the structures to 
build a part of or the entire patient’s healthcare record drawn from any number of 
heterogeneous systems (the only requirement is that they follow the ENV13606 pre-standard 
produced by CEN/TC251 WG I.3). The EHCR subsystem also uses an authentication service 
to authorize request messages from remote health care parties. 
 
                                                 
3 European Committee for Standardization (CEN), Technical Committee 251 (TC251): Health Informatics, Work Group I 
(WG I.): Information models, http://www.cenorm.be/ 
  
 
Figure 1 The OTMA system. Each medical unit is represented by an agent (circle in figure) which 
manages interactions with other units and with the EHCR subsystem. 
3.2 Adapting the OTMA system for Provenance 
Making the OTMA system provenance aware presented three challenging issues: a) the 
provenance of most of the data is not the execution of computational services, but decisions 
and actions carried out by real people in the real world (this is discussed in this Section 3); b) 
past treatments of a given patient in other institutions may be relevant to the current decisions 
in the current institution, so information of the processes undertaken in those previous 
treatments should be connected to the provenance information of a current process (this is 
discussed in Section 4); c) the agent with provenance information knows much more about 
the patient than any other agent in the system, so there are privacy risks to be mitigated (this is 
discussed in Section 5). 
In the case of the OTMA system, each organizational unit is represented by an agent-mediated 
service. Staff members of each unit can connect to the unit services by means of graphical 
user interfaces. The distributed execution of the OTM services is modeled as the interaction 
between the agents, and recorded as interaction p-assertions and relationship p-assertions. As 
in the OTM scenario a decision depends on the human making the decision, additional actor 
state p-assertions are recorded, containing further information on why the particular decision 
was made and, if available, the identities(s) of the team members involved in the decision. 
To illustrate how provenance is handled in the OTMA system, let us see how the provenance 
of a medical decision is recorded. Figure 2 (top) shows a simplified view over a subset of the 
donation process. We consider a patient who has previously given consent to donate his 
organs. As the patient’s health declines and in foresight of a potential organ donation, one of 
the doctors requests the full health record for the patient and then orders a serology test4 
through the OTMA system. After brain death is observed and logged in the system (along 
with the report certifying the brain death), if all requested data and analysis results have been 
obtained, a doctor is asked to make a decision about the patient being a potential donor. This 
decision is explained in a report that is submitted as the decision’s justification. 
                                                 
4 A serology test is usually performed over blood samples to detect viruses (HIV, Hepatitis B/C, syphilis, herpes or Epstein-
Barr virus), which, if present in the organ, can pass to the recipient. 
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Figure 2 Example scenario: (top) Interactions of the OTMA agents involved in a donation decision; 
(bottom) directed acyclic graph showing the provenance of the donation decision. 
Figure 2 (top) shows the OTMA agents for this small scenario and their interactions. The 
Transplant Unit User Interface Agent passes requests (TU.1, TU.2) to the OTM Donor Data 
Collector Agent, which gets the electronic record from the EHCR system (OTM.1, OTM.2). 
Sometimes all or parts of the record are not in the same institution but located in another 
institution (HC.1, HC.2). The Donor Data Collector Agent also sends the request for a 
serology test to the laboratory and gets back the result (OTM.4), along with a detailed report 
of the test. Reports are also passed in the case of the Brain Death notification (TU.3) and the 
final decision report (TU.5). 
Figure 2 (bottom) graphically represents the subset of the p-assertions produced by the 
provenance-aware OTMA which are related to the mini-scenario described above. The part of 
the process that happens within the electronic system is represented by interaction p-
assertions (regular boxes) for all interactions (TU.x, OTM.x, HC.x), and relationship p-
assertions (response_to, caused_by, based_on) capturing dependencies between data. Even 
though what happens in the system parallels what happens in the real world, as we already 
said this is not enough to fully determine the provenance of a given decision. To solve this, 
we connect the electronic process to the real world by adding actor state p-assertions stating 
who logged the information in the system (is_logged_in) and when (not shown in picture), 
which are the reports that justify a given state in the system (justified_by), who are the authors 
of these reports (authored_by) and when the action reported was performed or the decision 
taken (not shown). 
  
3.3 Analyzing an execution through the Provenance documentation 
Storing provenance information instead of the, more common, standard log systems, has the 
advantage that the provenance representation is stored in a way that complex queries can be 
performed over it, which allows a provenance-aware system to extract valuable information to 
validate some of the steps taken into a (medical) process, or even to make an audit of the 
system over a period of time. In the OTMA system, apart from periodical audits, transplant 
coordinators also want to ask the following types of provenance questions, related to a given 
patient (donor or recipient) or to the fate of a given organ: 
A. Where did the medical information used on each step of the process came from? 
B. Which medical actor was the source of some piece of information? 
C. What kind of medical record was available to actors at each step of the process?  
D. When a given medical process was carried out, and who was responsible for it?  
E. When was a decision taken, and what was the basis of the decision?  
F. Which medical actors were asked to provide medical data for a decision?  
G. Which medical actor refused to provide medical data for a decision? 
All these kind of questions can be answered by querying the provenance store. A query will 
give as a result (a subset of) the provenance representation graph of the process related to the 
query. If we use as an example the graph in Figure 2, by following the edges from the 
“Donation Decision” p-assertion we can trace the provenance of the donation decision, how it 
was based in some data and test requests, how a brain death notification is also involved, who 
requested the information, where it came from (in some cases it might come from the EHCR 
of another hospital), and who authored the justifying reports in the main steps of the process.  
In those cases (as in Figure 2) where the decision might be based on medical data coming 
from tests and medical treatments carried out in other institutions, another issue to solve is the 
following: how to find, retrieve and incorporate the provenance of the data coming from the 
other institution? If these institutions have also provenance-aware systems and the provenance 
stores of the different institutions are connected, to solve the aforementioned problem is to 
solve the issue of matching the different p-assertions related to the same patient. If this match 
is done, then actors can make p-assertions that link together the separate sets of p-assertions to 
create a larger provenance document providing an integrated view of the healthcare history of 
the patient. The result (not shown on Figure 2) would be that the p-assertions related to 
Patient Data Hospital B would be linked to the set of p-assertions already part of the 
provenance of the Donation Decision.  
Collectively the p-assertions can be seen as describing a distributed process, spanning space 
as well as time. Every relationship described is causal, i.e. between the cause of something 
happening and the effect of it happening, and is therefore also temporal, i.e. causes always 
come before effects. Furthermore, extra information can be added to provide further detail. 
For example, an actor may record, as an actor state p-assertion, the time shown on their local 
clock. Together, the structured documentation of processes allow a rich set of questions to be 
asked about what occurred, why, when and by whom and, in the OTMA system, such a 
process may be a patient's healthcare history. 
4 Process Documentation in Provenance Aware HC-MAS 
As seen in the previous section, in order to create an integrated view of a patient’s healthcare 
history, the process documentation created by each healthcare institution must contain 
  
interaction p-assertions and relationship p-assertions which link together the p-assertions of 
agents in the process. The way in which p-assertions provide this linking in usual service-
oriented applications is by use of a common identifier, called an interaction key, for both 
parties, sender and receiver, in an interaction. From the fact that two agents have recorded 
documentation using the same interaction key, we can determine that their actions were part 
of the same process, and therefore both are part of the provenance of the process’ output. 
However, to record p-assertions with the same interaction key, two agents must exchange that 
key, which means they must electronically interact.  
In this section we show that there are processes without direct electronic interaction. Because 
processes executed by healthcare agents often belong to this category, for example in the 
OTMA system the processes of the EHCR subsystem or relevant previous treatment processes 
carried out in other hospitals, we describe how independent autonomous agents can jointly 
create process documentations of these processes. 
4.1 Healthcare Processes as Weakly Connected Processes 
There is a basic difference between a typical business process and healthcare applications 
such as the EHCR subsystem of the OTMA system introduced above. In a typical business or 
e-science application the agents participating in the process are in contact and connected by 
interactions between them. In this case there is exchange of documented messages, and we 
say that there is direct interaction between the agents. 
In medical processes, however, the physicians treating the same patient may not be in direct 
contact. This is typical, but not necessarily specific to medical processes. The patient may be 
treated by one physician, be healthy for a while, and then go to another physician with another 
disease, in some cases as a consequence of the previous disease. In this case, the second 
physician is not in contact with the first, they do not know each other's identity and because 
the identities cannot be revealed for privacy reasons, the p-assertions belonging to the same 
patient cannot be linked together automatically. In this case we say that there is latent 
interaction between the physician agents. Note that the patient usually cannot determine the 
link between the current treatment and the previous one. Even if the patient remembers 
something informally, the formal link cannot be determined. 
We can now define two types of processes: strongly connected and weakly connected 
processes. We view the processes as graphs where the nodes are the activities executed by 
agents alone and arcs are the interactions, either latent or direct. In strongly connected 
processes the whole process graph contains only direct interactions, whereas in weakly 
connected processes the process graph can be cut into two sub-graphs that are connected to 
each other only by one or more latent interactions. The full healthcare history of a patient is 
usually created by a weakly connected process containing strongly connected sub-processes. 
Although the transplant process of OTMA is strongly connected, it becomes “infected” with 
the latent interactions of the EHCR creation process when the EHCR of the patient is 
retrieved. 
4.2 Process Documentation of Strongly Connected Processes 
Figure 3, similarly to Figure 2, shows the model of strongly connected processes and their 
process documentation. Here, physicians are represented by agents 1 and 2. They are the 
actors of treatment processes 1 (treatmentp_1) and 2 (treatmentp_2). At some point, agent 1 
sends the patient to agent 2 in a documented way. P-assertions about this interaction are 
recorded by agents 1 and 2. In case of medical or other secure applications, a global identifier 
for a patient in the local system is not used, because it could be used to determine the identity 
  
of the patient. Because the agents interact directly and electronically, they agree on an 
interaction key and both include it in their p-assertions. This way the process documentations 
of the treatment processes are not disjoint, therefore if some agent queries the process 
documentation using patient_local_name_1, then the provenance system is able to return all 
process documentation comprising the provenance of the patient.  
agent_1 
treatmentp_1 
agent_2 
treatmentp_2 
interaction_1_2 
patient_1 
p_assertion_1.1: 
patient_local_name_1 
type . . . 
p_assertion_1.n: 
patient_local_name_1 
type interaction 
p_assertion_1.2: 
patient_local_name_1 
type . . . 
p_assertion_2.1: 
patient_local_name_2 
type interaction 
p_assertion_2.m: 
patient_local_name_2 
type . . . 
interaction_key_1_2 
 
Figure 3 Process documentation in strongly connected processes. P-assertions of strongly connected 
processes are linked together by the p-assertions related to the interaction connecting the two processes. 
4.3 Process Documentation of Weakly Connected Healthcare 
Processes 
Process documentation creation is a bit more complicated in the case of weakly connected 
healthcare processes, when there is no direct interaction between the agents. The actors, 
processes and process documentation in a weakly connected healthcare process are similar to 
the one shown in Figure 3, but there is no link across the sets of p-assertions of the processes 
executed by the different agents. If we want to retrieve the complete provenance of the 
patient, then we are interested in both sets. Moreover if agent 2 finds out somehow that 
treatment process 2 is some way a consequence of treatment process 1, it still cannot find the 
relevant p-assertions made by agent 1, because there is no common identifier for the processes 
or the patient. 
If there was interaction between the agents, then the common identifier could be the common 
interaction key which they share. However an interaction key is used to identify the flow of 
information between two steps/actors in a process, and is an "internal" identifier, in that it has 
no meaning outside of the process documentation and while, theoretically, it corresponds to 
one patient wherever the information exchanged in an interaction concerns just one patient, 
there is no mapping held in the system between an interaction key and any other patient 
identifier. 
  
Although the patient could present its global identifier, such as its social security number, to 
the physicians, but this global identifier cannot be used in process documentation for privacy 
reasons as discussed in Section 5. 
4.4 Method to Link Process Documentations of Weakly Connected 
Processes 
We have described the problem of process documentation creation resulting from the lack of 
direct interaction between the agents. The solution to the problem is to use an intermediate 
institution in a higher hierarchical level, which is in contact with both agents and knows about 
the patient as well. This is usual in medical domains, as they are regulated by national and 
international bodies and there are services which give a global identifier to the patient, such as 
the national security number. But the global identifier should not be used in documentation of 
privacy-aware processes, because regulations ordain the separation of data, which means that 
medical information and personal identification cannot be stored together and anonymised 
identifiers must be used instead. Therefore, usually we should add an anonymisation service 
in HC-MAS to convert real patient identifiers to anonymised patient identifiers. 
Figure 4 shows how this method works. In the first step of this method, we locate in the 
application an already existing service which is used to anonymise patient identifiers. If there 
is no such service, then we introduce it into the application. The service is called anon_service 
in the figure.  
  
agent_1 
treatmentp_1 
agent_2 
treatmentp_2 
no interaction 
patient_1 
p_assertion_1.1: 
patient_local_name_1 
type actor_state 
p_assertion_1.n: 
patient_local_name_1 
type . . . 
p_assertion_2.1: 
patient_local_name_2 
type actor_state 
p_assertion_2.m: 
patient_local_name_2 
type . . . 
anon_service 
p_assertion_as.1: 
patient_local_name_as 
type actor_state 
p_assertion_as.3: 
type relation 
p_assertion_as.5: 
type relation 
interaction interaction 
p_assertion_2.2 
patient_local_name_2 
type interaction 
p_assertion_1.2 
patient_local_name_1 
type interaction 
p_assertion_as.2: 
patient_local_name_as 
type interaction 
p_assertion_as.4: 
patient_local_name_as 
type interaction 
 
Figure 4 Linking of process documentations in weakly connected healthcare processes. P-assertions 
of weakly connected healthcare processes are linked together by the p-assertions of a higher level service. 
The second important element of the method is that the anonymisation service documents its 
own processing. Whenever a new patient identity becomes known to the anonymisation 
service, then the anonymisation service puts an actor state p-assertion into the provenance 
store about the patient identity. Note that the provenance store does not contain the global 
patient identifier, only the anonymised identifier. 
The third important element of the method is that the agents adopt the norm of notifying the 
anonymisation service when a new activity with a patient is started. In Figure 4, when agent 1 
starts an activity on the patient, it makes an actor state p-assertion about the start of the 
activity and notifies the anonymisation service that the activity started. The interaction is 
recorded in the provenance store with interaction p-assertions on both sides. The 
anonymisation service asserts a relationship p-assertion between the p-assertion related to the 
anonymised patient identity and the p-assertion related to interaction between agent 1 and the 
anonymisation service. When agent 2 starts an activity on the patient, it behaves similarly, 
therefore there will be an indirect link between the two agent’s processes, and the complete 
provenance of the patient record can be determined. 
Although conceptually the anonymisation service becomes somehow a central interaction 
node in the system, scalability can be maintained. Agents communicate limited amount of 
data with the anonymisation service only when they start a new case. The anonymisation 
  
service creates a new p-assertion for the case, and agents link further p-assertions to the start 
case p-assertion without communicating with the anonymisation service. The functionality of 
the anonymisation service can be distributed in real implemented systems among cooperating 
services allocated to countries, regions, insurance companies, etc. 
In addition to the ability to return the whole process documentation, the method described 
above has two other advantages: the agents can improve the quality of the process 
documentation and of their own activities.  
The quality of the process documentation can be improved if the agents discover some 
relationship from the real processes (e.g. the current illness of the patient is a consequence of 
a problem in the previous treatment not discovered before). In these cases, they can augment 
the existing links documented by the anonymisation service with direct causal relationships. 
This is now possible, because, by following the anonymisation service based links, the p-
assertions relevant to a single patient can be located, identified and linked. 
The agents can improve the quality of their own activities using the linked process 
documentation, because when agent 2 executes its treatment process, it can already retrieve 
the p-assertions of agent 1. If the physician knows the details of the previous treatment of the 
patient, then he/she might use that information in the current treatment. 
5 Protecting Privacy in the Provenance-aware Application 
In healthcare applications, enforceable privacy rules are extremely important. Protection of 
individuals’ health-related data has been a continued concern of the medical body from the 
very beginning of the medical practice, as reflected in the famous Hippocratic oath. There 
exist considerable efforts to put into practice a body of policies which ensure the protection of 
medical data in a scenario of massive use of computers in the health sector. Regulations5 
define guidelines about the adequate organizational and technical measures that must be taken 
in medical information systems. One of these guidelines is related to the separation of data: as 
a general rule, the design of data structures, procedures and access control policies must be 
such that they allow the separation of a) identifiers and data related to a person’s identity, b) 
administrative data, c) medical data, and d) genetic data. Such separation must ensure that no 
unauthorized person can connect the identity of the patient with his medical or genetic data.  
In EHCR systems, and in the OTMA system discussed above, a typical solution for the 
separation of identity information and medical data is the anonymised identifier. The 
anonymised identifier is generated from real patient identifier, and medical data is stored 
together with this anonymised identifier. If we know the real patient identifier, then we can 
find the corresponding medical data, but from the medical data we cannot find out the identity 
of the patient. 
When we make agent systems provenance-aware, we introduce an additional data store into 
the system: the provenance store. There is a conflict between provenance and privacy. While 
for provenance we need as much information as possible about the whole process (who did 
what and when), for privacy we need to restrict as much as possible the information available, 
in order to avoid identification of patients and practitioners by unauthorized users.  
                                                 
5 “Directive 95/46/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 october 1995 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and of the free movement of such data,” Official Journal of the European 
Communities, L 281/31 - L 281/39., October 1995. 
  
In the provenance aware OTMA system two techniques are used to protect privacy: a) we do 
not store sensitive medical data in the provenance store, and b) we use anonymised patient 
identifiers in provenance stores.  
In order to protect medical data, agents do not store sensitive medical data in the provenance 
store, but only references to such data. This way the provenance store contains only the 
linkage and the skeleton of the provenance of the medical data, and the healthcare data can be 
laid on the skeleton by retrieving it from the healthcare information system when needed. The 
retrieval is done via the EHCR system which is completely under the control of EHCR access 
rules. With this approach we keep the same degree of privacy of medical data as in the 
original agent system.  
One might think that if we do not store medical information about patients in the provenance 
store, then there is no need to anonymise the patients and we can use real patient identifiers, 
because no medical information can be inferred about the patient. However this is not the 
case. Even the fact that the patient was treated can be sensitive information, and the reference 
to the place where the medical data of the treatment was carried out may contain sensitive 
information, because the type of institution can reveal the type of medical intervention. 
Therefore the patient identity has to be anonymised at least.  
The anonymisation procedure should be irreversible: nobody should be able to tell the real 
identity of the patient by knowing the anonymised identifier. The method described in Section 
4.4 satisfies this requirement. The irreversibility of the anonymisation is guaranteed by the 
way data storage is organized: the anonymisation service does not store the mapping from the 
real patient identifier to the anonymised patient identifier and computes the anonymised 
identifier each time it is needed using its own non-trivial algorithm. As a result, the real 
identifier and the anonymised identifier are not stored together anywhere in the system and 
the mapping from one identifier to the other cannot be found out without the algorithm of the 
anonymisation service. 
6 Related Work 
In those first investigations which started to record the origin and history of a piece of data, 
the concept was called lineage. In the SDTS standard6, lineage was a kind of audit trail that 
traced each step in sourcing, moving, and processing data, mainly related to a single data 
item, a logical data record, a subset of a database, or to an entire database [7]. There was also 
relationship to versioning [8] and data warehouses [9]. The provenance concept was later 
further explored within the GriPhyN project7. The application of provenance in grid systems 
was extended in two respects: 1) data was not necessarily stored in databases and the 
operations used to derive data items might have been arbitrary computations; and 2) issues 
relating to the automated generation and scheduling of the computations required to 
instantiate data products were also addressed. The PROVENANCE project builds on these 
concepts to conceive and implement an industrial strength open provenance architecture. 
To our knowledge, the application of provenance techniques to HC-MAS is novel. In organ 
allocation management, there are few ICT solutions giving powerful support to the allocation 
of human organs which keep records of the distributed execution of processes. The 
                                                 
6 American National Standard for Information Systems. Spatial Data Transfer Standard (SDTS) - Part 1, Logical 
Specifications, Secretariat, United States Geological Survey, National Mapping Division, DRAFT for Review, November 
20, 1997, http://mcmcweb.er.usgs.gov/sdts/SDTS_standard_nov97/part1b12.html 
7 http://www.griphyn.org 
  
EUROTRANSPLANT8 system is a centralized system where all information and decisions 
are made in a central server, and all activity is recorded in standard logging systems. The 
OTM system of Calisti et al. [10] is a distributed system (developed in collaboration with 
Swisstransplant) which combines agent technology and constraint satisfaction techniques for 
decision making support in organ transplant centers. In this case all activity is also recorded in 
standard logging systems. 
7 Conclusions and ongoing work 
In this paper, we have discussed the important issues of making healthcare agent applications 
provenance-aware. Provenance-awareness enables users to trace how a particular result has 
been produced by identifying the individual and aggregated services that produced a 
particular output. This helps users to get an integrated view of the treatment process executed 
by distributed autonomous agents, and to be able to carry out audits of the system to assess 
that, for a given patient, the proper decisions were made and the proper procedures were 
followed. We discussed the special techniques needed in agent systems to make the 
autonomous and independent actors provenance aware and produce joint process 
documentation. We presented provenance awareness through the example of the CARREL 
agent system in the organ transplant management application domain. We detailed a method 
of documenting processes by weakly connected autonomous healthcare agents and showed 
how this method helps to retain security and privacy of data within the process documentation 
produced by HC-MAS. 
In the context of the PROVENANCE project we are building a first demonstrator of this 
application. Evaluation is planned with some hospital and transplant coordinators in Spain, 
who will give feedback in the lasts steps of the development and fine-tuning of the 
application. The method is expected to improve process documentation by allowing the 
creation and retrieval of complete processes. The improvement is attained in two aspects: the 
agents can improve the quality of the process documentation and the agents can improve the 
quality of their own activities. 
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